This paper proposes that in an initial public offering (IPO), pre-IPO owners make decisions regarding share retention, share lockup, and underpricing to improve liquidity, which in turn increases the value of shares they retain. We suggest that underpricing will increase the number of investors following the stock and foster more trading in both the short run and the long run.
Introduction
The finance literature is replete with evidence that initial public offerings (IPOs) are underpriced, on average. Several hypotheses have been proffered to explain this phenomenon. This paper proposes that pre-IPO owners underprice the IPO to improve liquidity so that they can increase the value of shares they retain. We argue that underpricing increases the number of investors following the stock and foster more trading in both the short run and the long run. As the proportion of shares retained increases, liquidity decreases, ceteris paribus, so other mechanisms, such as underpricing, must be used to boost liquidity. Thus, we predict that IPO underpricing is positively related to the proportion of shares retained. Our predictions are supported by empirical evidence.
In addition, we find that for IPOs that include a lockup restriction underpricing is more substantial, and the positive relation between share retention and underpricing is much stronger.
We also explore the relation between underpricing and aftermarket trading volume. We find that the relationship between underpricing and trading volume is much stronger for IPOs with lockup.
IPOs with lockup also have higher trading volume, and a significant part of this difference is associated with the effect of underpricing. This evidence supports the argument that, for IPOs with lockup, underpricing improves liquidity more effectively and thus its use is more closely associated with share retention.
Literature Review
Researchers have advanced several explanations for the IPO underpricing phenomenon, with different hypotheses focusing on aspects of the relationships among investors, issuers, and/or investment bankers that take firms public. In general, these theories are not mutually exclusive, and evidence is often consistent with several hypotheses simultaneously. Here we briefly review recent literature that relates to our paper. Aggarwal et al. (2001) present a model in which the manager strategically underprices the IPO in order to maximize his wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. They argue that first day underpricing creates information momentum, i.e., it generates incremental comments and recommendations by research analysts, especially by non-lead underwriter analysts. Assuming a downward sloping demand curve, they suggest that this increased research coverage shifts the demand curve for the stock outward, allowing the manager to sell shares at the lockup expiration at prices higher than he would otherwise be able to obtain. They test the model on a sample of IPOs in the 1990s. They find: (a) managerial share and option holdings are positively related to first day returns (i.e., to underpricing); and (b) higher first day return is associated with more analyst research coverage. They also find that research coverage is positively related to (a) stock price performance through the lockup expiration; and (b) insider selling at the expiration of the lockup.
The strategic underpricing hypothesis
However, a key link in their argument is missing in their results. If underpricing leads to more analyst research coverage, which in turn leads to better stock price performance, then underpricing should be positively related to post-IPO stock performance. But underpricing is not significantly related to post-IPO stock performance in their regression. In addition, IPO underpricing is not significantly related to managerial shareholdings when management option holdings are not included. Our arguments and evidence fill this gap. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) suggest that promoting an IPO can be an alternative to underpricing the issue. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners' participation in the offering and the magnitude of dilution they suffer on retained shares. They argue that the extent to which owners trade off underpricing and promotion is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses.
The wealth loss minimization hypothesis
Empirically, Habib and Ljungqvist find that underpricing decreases in promotion costs and promotion costs increase in the number of shares sold. Furthermore, underpricing decreases in insider selling. At the margin, each dollar spent on promotion reduces wealth losses by 98 cents.
These findings support the predictions of their model. Loughran and Ritter (2002) suggest that IPO underpricing is an indirect form of underwriter compensation and an indirect cost to issuers. Issuers acquiesce to substantial underpricing only when they are simultaneously receiving good news in the form of unanticipated wealth increases.
The prospect theory model
They bargain hard over the offer price in a bad state of the world and become pushovers in bargaining over the offer price in a good state of the world. Empirically, Loughran and Ritter find that, consistent with Hanley (1993) , if the offer price is revised upward, the IPO will be underpriced more substantially. In addition, both the upward revision and underpricing are positively related to the market rise before the IPO. The evidence supports their theory.
A Liquidity-Based Theory of Share Retention, Trading Volume, and Underpricing
Our stance in this paper is that the overriding motivation for an IPO is to establish a liquid market for the firm's stock. Pre-IPO owners' share retention decision affects the liquidity of stock in the aftermarket. As we know, on average IPO pre-IPO owners retain about 2/3 of the firm's post-IPO shares. These shares cannot trade freely in the stock market under Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933. As pre-IPO owners retain more shares, fewer shares are floating in the aftermarket. With fewer floating shares, IPO stocks will have lower trading volume and thus lower liquidity. In addition, when more shares are retained, outside investors are more likely to trade with pre-IPO owners, who usually have inside information about the firm. As such, outside investors face higher information risk (i.e., greater risk associated with information-asymmetry induced moral hazard) in trading. This further reduces the trading interest of outside investors.
Consistent with these arguments, Reese (1998) documents evidence of negative relation between share retention and trading volume.
Many IPO contracts include a lockup restriction, which prohibits pre-IPO owners from selling retained shares for a certain period, even under exemptions to Rule 144. The standard lockup period is 180 days. It is difficult to determine the net effect of lockup on liquidity. On one hand, lockup prevents the trading of those retained shares that could have been sold in the market under Rule 144. This reduces the number of floating shares and tends to reduce liquidity. On the other hand, lockup prevents corporate insiders from taking advantage of outside investors in stock trading during the lockup period. In addition, if there is less insider-based information content in the aftermarket trading of an IPO stock with lockup, the stock's bid-ask spread wil be lower. Both of the latter effects encourage trading. It is difficult to determine whether they outweigh the negative effect of lockup on floating shares. We must rely on empirical data to determine the net liquidity effect of lockup.
Underpricing may also affect the aftermarket liquidity of an IPO stock. Reese (1998) finds that aftermarket trading volume is positively related to underpricing. He also finds that media coverage is positively related to both underpricing and trading volume. His interpretation is that investors' interest on the IPO stock explains the initial return and trading volume.
We view Reese's evidence and interpretation incomplete. He does not explain why investors have an interest in an IPO stock in the first place and, more importantly, why pre-IPO owners do not take advantage of investors' interest. Why do pre-IPO owners fail to increase the IPO price when they know investors are very interested in their IPO? Our interpretation is that pre-IPO owners intentionally underprice IPO to improve aftermarket liquidity. A liquid market improves pre-IPO owners' ability to sell the shares that they initially retained. In addition, if the stock is actively traded, the retained shares become more valuable because investors demand lower liquidity premium on the stock (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) ). The more shares pre-IPO owners retain, the less liquid is the stock, and the more important it is for pre-IPO owners to have a liquid aftermarket. Underpricing can improve trading liquidity in the aftermarket. So pre-IPO owners underprice the IPO. There are costs associated with underpricing. But the cost of underpricing decreases with share retention. All these effects work in the same direction: the more shares pre-IPO owners retain, the more severely they underprice the IPO.
Determinants of Trading Volume
Next, we argue that generally, investors trade with each other when either: (a) they have different expectations about the value of the stock; or (b) they are adjusting their liquidity positions.
Regarding (a), investors with relatively high valuation of an IPO stock will have higher reservation bid price and ask prices, while investors with lower valuation will have lower reservation bid and ask prices. Investors in the two groups will trade with each other if the reservation bid price of an high-value investor is higher than the ask price of a low-value investor. Also, trading occurs if and whenever investors adjust their expectations, possibly differentially, based on either (a) common information they gather and process, or (b) information that an individual investor gathers and processes privately. As such, an investor who was the seller in the last hour may become the buyer in the next hour.
The frequency of trading depends on both the collection of new information and the information investors already possess. On one hand, gathering and processing information about a given stock is costly and subject to economies of scale, so a specific investor will find it more efficient to follow a limited number of stocks and build information advantage on each. When more investors follow a particular stock, as new value-relevant information about the stock arrives, more investors will adjust their expectations, possibly differentially. Thus, stocks followed by a large number of investors will have higher trading volume. In contrast, if a stock has few followers, less information is collected and processed, so new information will not lead to many trades because few investors adjust their expectations about the value of the stock.
On the other hand, the information investors already have about a particular stock also affects trading frequency. If investors do not have much information about a stock, they will exhibit high reservation bid-ask spreads. High reservation spreads may often prevent investors from trading with each other, even if they differentially interpret that value of new information. In contrast, if investors have more information about a stock's current status, reservation spreads will be relatively small, and trading volume generally will be higher.
How does underpricing improve liquidity?
In the case of an IPO, underpricing can improve liquidity for any of three reasons. First, underpricing creates short run trading. Second, underpricing increases the number of investors who collect and react to new information about the stock. Third, underpricing reduces investors' reservation bid-ask spreads and increases the probability that new information will result in trades.
Both information asymmetry and heterogeneous expectations are generally very severe in the case of an IPO stock. These are major obstacles to the development of a liquid market for an IPO stock. If an IPO is underpriced in the opinions of most investors, the offering will attract more investors, including not only most or all high-value investors, but also some low-value investors who otherwise would not have an interest in the offering. All interested investors have an incentive to conduct research on the stock, and those who conclude that the IPO is underpriced will purchase shares. The IPO will thus be over-subscribed and the limited number of shares offered must be allocated. High-value investors will not get as many shares as they have ordered, and some low-value investors will be allocated shares. In the short run, high-value investors will trade with low-value investors in the aftermarket, generating trading volume.
For the longer horizon, many investors who have conducted research on the stock will continue following the stock because they have made an information investment, even though they do not necessarily hold the stock at any particular point in time. When new information arrives, more investors will adjust their expectations, and holdings, of the stock. Based on their research, they have more information about the stock and their reservation bid-ask spreads are lower. Thus, trading volume will be higher. That is why underpricing improves the liquidity of an IPO stock. How long this effect persists is an empirical issue. Reese (1998) finds that this relation persists for more than 3 years beyond the issue date.
Underpricing and share retention
The effects of share retention on underpricing are three-fold. First, as more shares are retained, pre-IPO owners lose less initially, and gain more later, from underpricing. The more shares pre-IPO owners retain, the more shares they can sell in the aftermarket. If the stock is liquid, investors will demand a lower liquidity premium on the stock. In addition, higher liquidity means there is lower trading cost and further improves the price pre-IPO owners receive when they actually sell retained shares. So pre-IPO owners have more incentive to improve the liquidity of the stock by underpricing when they retain more shares. In contrast, if pre-IPO owners do not retain any shares, they may care little about liquidity in the aftermarket, but are highly concerned about the offer price, so they have no incentive to underprice the offering.
Second, when more shares are retained, the number of floating shares will be reduced and the stock will be less liquid, ceteris paribus. Thus, underpricing is required to improve liquidity.
Third, the more shares pre-IPO owners retain, the less costly underpricing is to them. For example, given the same degree of underpricing, say 10%, if pre-IPO owners offer only 10% of the original shares to the market and retain 90%, the underpricing will cost them only 1% of the value of their shareholdings 1 . On the other hand, if they offer all of their shareholdings in IPO, the underpricing will lead to a possible 10% loss in their wealth. Obviously, higher share retention will make underpricing less costly.
The first effect provides incentives for pre-IPO owners to underprice the IPO when they retain a significant number of shares. The second and the third effect strengthen the first effect.
Overall, when pre-IPO owners retain more shares, they will underprice the IPO more substantially.
The effect of lockup
As we mentioned earlier, the effect of lockup on liquidity is the net of several factors.
Moreover, this net effect may in turn affect the relation between IPO underpricing and share retention. Lockup prevents corporate insiders from taking advantage of outside investors in stock trading, so the same magnitude of underpricing may lead to a larger number of investors following the stock, and thus trading may also be more active. Thus, the relation between IPO underpricing and liquidity will be stronger when there is lockup. In this case, the relation between share retention and IPO underpricing will also be stronger. In other words, if underpricing can improve liquidity more significantly for IPOs with lockup, pre-IPO owners will be more willing to underprice the IPO for the same magnitude of share retention, and the relation between share retention and underpricing will be more substantial.
On the other hand, if lockup reduces liquidity, the effect of lockup on the relation between underpricing and liquidity will be different to discern; we may not be able to predict the effect of lockup on the relation between share retention and underpricing. So, again we have to rely on the results of empirical tests.
Testable Hypotheses
The arguments above suggest following testable hypotheses:
1. Share retention is positively related to IPO underpricing.
2. When pre-IPO owners retain few shares, the IPO will not be substantially underpriced.
In the next section we test these two hypotheses.
Empirical Tests

Sample characteristics
We collected a preliminary sample of IPOs from Security Data Company's (SDC) new-issues database. This sample consists of 7,830 IPOs issued between January 1970 and December 2000.
We examined the offerings in this sample and deleted those observations we consider as
unreliable. An IPO observation is considered as unreliable if:
(1). Trading data is reported in the Center for Securities Prices (CRSP) database for an IPO stock before either the first trading day or the issue date reported by SDC. Such a discrepancy suggests that the first trading day or issuing date is erroneous. 475 IPO observations are deleted because of this problem.
(2). The number of shares outstanding is missing. Some IPO observations in the SDC database do not have the data for number of shares outstanding. For these observations, we try to collect the number of shares outstanding on the first trading day from CRSP. After this step, 513
observations still have missing value for the number of shares outstanding.
(3). The number of shares offered as reported by SDC is larger than the number of shares outstanding. Five observations are deleted because of this problem.
After we delete all the unreliable observations, 6,837 IPO observations remain. Then we delete all the IPOs that do not have a first day closing price available from CRSP. This reduces the sample size to 5,287. If an IPO stock does not have daily trading volume data for at least one day from the 129 th trading day to the 500 th trading day after issue, it is also deleted. After this step, the final sample consists of 5,183 IPOs issued between 1976 and 1998.
The yearly distributions of the IPOs in the original sample and the final sample are reported in Table 1 . Comparing the preliminary sample to the final sample, we find that our sample selection criteria resulted in the discarding of most IPOs before 1980 and all IPOs after 1998, the latter loss occurring because of the trading volume data requirement. For the other years, our final sample compares closely to the preliminary sample.
Consistent with previous studies of IPOs (e.g., Ibbotson et al. 1994) , (1982), we define the retention ratio as the ratio of the number of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders to total shares outstanding after the IPO. This ratio is denoted as Retention1.
Our sample is most comparable with the sample used in Bradley and Jordan (2002) in size and time period. We note that the magnitude of underpricing in our sample is about half of that in Bradley and Jordan (2002) . We attribute this to the fact that they used initial return data provided by SDC database to measure underpricing while we calculated underpricing based on the stock price data from CRSP. To prove this conjecture, we retrieve initial return data from SDC database for our sample and calculated the average. We find that the average SDC initial return in our sample is very close to the level reported in Bradley and Jordan (2002) . So the difference in underpricing magnitude is not caused by our sampling method.
Comparing mean statistics across the three sub-samples, we point out the following important differences:
( 
Test the relation between share retention and underpricing
The general pattern
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 discussed in section 3.5, we examine the relationship between share retention and IPO underpricing. First, we sort IPOs into six groups according to the level of Retention1 (proportion of shares retained) and compare average underpricing across these groups. Retention1 does not distribute uniformly across the range of zero and one, so to determine breakpoints we imposed the restriction that each group has more than 500
observations. As a result, the first group contains Mean underpricing is nearly perfectly monotonically increasing in share retention. When pre-IPO owners retain less than 1% of the shares, the IPOs are underpriced by 1.82% on average (0.0% in the median). This is consistent with our hypothesis that IPOs will not be significantly underpriced when pre-IPO owners retain few shares. As share retention increases, underpricing also increases. When pre-IPO owners retain more than 80% of all the shares, the IPOs are underpriced by almost 16%. This is consistent with our hypothesis that share retention is positively related to IPO underpricing.
Of course, it is unlikely that share retention is the only factor affecting IPO underpricing.
Other characteristics may affect the level of underpricing, and must be controlled in order to more accurately gauge the relationship between share retention and underpricing. Next, we use multiple regression analysis to test the relation between share retention and IPO underpricing.
The multiple regression model as follows:
where IR is the first-day or initial return on IPO stock i, calculated as the percentage difference of the first-day closing price to the offer price, Retention1 is as previously defined, and X is a vector of control variables. The coefficient b 1 will be positive if the relationship documented in Figure 1 -1 is robust to controls for other factors.
We select control variables based on the existing literature on IPO underpricing. Hanley (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (2002) [Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Lowry and Schwert (2001)]). Hanley (1993) finds that IPO underpricing is positively related to the market return before IPO. To control for this factor, we use RUNUP, the cumulative percentage return of CRSP equally weighted index in the fifteen trading days leading up to the issue date.
We also control for the influence of insider trading as reported in Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) . Our control variable for this factor is SECON, the proportion of secondary shares among all the shares offered.
Previous researchers have found that IPO underpricing is related to the market share of the lead underwriter, the size of the offering, and the offer price. To control for the effects of these characteristics, we include the following three variables: (a) UWMS, the percentage average equity IPO market share of the lead underwriter by year; (b) LISIZE, the natural log of number of shares offered; and (c) INVP, the inverse of offer price.
The relationships between IPO underpricing and other characteristics either have not been explored or are unclear, so we include additional variables to control for these characteristics.
These variables are ALLOT, VENTURE, NASDAQ and LOCK. ALLOT is the proportion of over-allotment shares relative to shares offered. VENTURE is a dummy equal to one when the IPO firm is backed by a VC, and zero otherwise. NASDAQ is a dummy equal to one when the IPO is issued in Nasdaq, and zero otherwise. LOCK is a dummy equal to one when the IPO has lockup provision, and zero otherwise. The regressions also include 13 industry dummies to control for any possible industry effects.
The regression results for the entire sample are reported in the first two columns of Table 3 .
The coefficient on Retention1 is positive and highly significant. Thus, the positive relationship between share retention and underpricing is robust to controls for other factors, and is consistent with the results of the grouping analysis shown in Figure 1-1 . Thus, the hypothesis that IPO underpricing is positively related to share retention is strongly supported.
The coefficients of UP1, UP2, DW2, LAG, INVP, RUNUP are highly significantly positive and of SECON is significantly negative. The coefficient for VENTURE is significantly negative, suggesting that IPOs backed by VCs are less underpriced. These results are consistent with previous studies including Bradley and Jordan (2001) , although their initial return data is drawn from the SDC database. The coefficient of NASDAQ is positive, indicating that NASDAQ IPOs are more underpriced.
The influence of lockup
The coefficient of the final independent variable shown in Table 3 , LOCK, is positive and significant. This suggests that locked IPOs are more underpriced, even after controlling for many factors, including share retention.
However, the multiple regression setting provided only a rough test of the influence of lockup on underpricing. As a finer test, we repeat the multiple regression on the data for the 
Test the relation between underpricing and liquidity
The time series behavior of trading volume
According to our theory, pre-IPO owners underprice the IPO to improve the liquidity of the stock in the aftermarket. Our theory draws support from the empirical results of Reese (1998) , who provides evidence that aftermarket trading volume is positively related to IPO underpricing. In this section, we conduct additional tests of this relationship.
Reese ( 
The general pattern
We are interested in the relationship between underpricing and aftermarket trading volume for IPO stocks, so we examine time series averages of adjusted daily trading volume for two periods:
from the 5 th trading day to the 122 th trading day and from the 129 th trading day to the 500 th trading day. For each IPO stock, we calculate time series averages of adjusted daily trading volume over each of the two periods. Then we examine the relation between the averages of adjusted daily trading volume and IPO underpricing using regression (2).
VO is the time series average of adjusted daily trading volume. LIR is the log of initial return. h , and H are coefficients. According to our theory and earlier empirical results from Reese (1998), We expect h to be positive. The results of regression (2) for the full sample are reported in the first two columns of Tables 4 and 5 . Consistent with Reese (1998) , for both of the two periods, average adjusted trading volumes are significantly positively related to IPO initial return. This supports our argument that pre-IPO owners underprice the issue to improve aftermarket liquidity.
Note that the coefficient for the dummy of LOCK is positive and highly significant. This result indicates that IPOs with lockup are more actively traded, and thus the result is consistent with the results shown in Figure 2 . Considering earlier discussions about the effect of lockup on liquidity, the evidence indicates that lockup prevents insiders from taking advantage of outside investors in trading, and that this positive effect on liquidity outweighs the negative effect of lockup on the number of floating shares. In the next section we will explore the relationship between lockup, underpricing, and trading volume more closely.
IPOs with and without lockup
Our finding that IPOs with lockup are more actively traded reminds us that in section 4.2, we found higher underpricing and stronger relation between underpricing and share retention for IPOs with lockup. According to our theory, higher liquidity may be partly due to higher underpricing for IPOs with lockup. Possibly, lockup provides pre-IPO owners an incentive to take actions that increase long run liquidity. If underpricing improves long run liquidity more significantly for IPOs with lockup, pre-IPO owners will be more likely to underprice more to improve long run liquidity. If not, they may try to use other methods to improve liquidity. In this case, the stronger relationship between underpricing and share retention for IPOs with lockup may be explained by a stronger relation between underpricing and aftermarket trading volume.
So now we have two conjectures to test:
1. The relation between underpricing and aftermarket trading volume is stronger for IPOs with lockup; and 2. At least part of the higher trading volume for IPOs with lockup is related to greater underpricing.
We apply regression (2) (excluding the control variable LOCK) on the three sub-samples.
The results are reported in the right side columns of Tables 4 and 5 . Consistent with the first conjecture above, the coefficient on LIR, the log of initial return, is larger and much more significant for IPOs with lockup for both of the two periods after the IPO date. It appears that investors will trade IPO shares more actively given the same degree of underpricing if the IPO has lockup provision. In this case, pre-IPO owners will be more likely to use underpricing to improve liquidity. This leads to the stronger relation between share retention and IPO underpricing for IPOs with lockup that we reported earlier.
To examine the second conjecture, we attempt to measure the net effect of underpricing on liquidity. We do this by calculating the product of the mean of LIR and the coefficient on LIR in the regression. The mean of LIR is the cross-sectional average of LIR. The product can be interpreted as incremental adjusted volume associated with underpricing. Then we compare this product to mean adjusted volume, which is the cross-sectional average of the time series averages of VO. The results are reported in Table 5 .
Clearly, underpricing is more substantially positively associated with higher trading volume for IPOs with lockup. For IPOs with lockup, the adjusted trading volume associated with underpricing for the two time periods are 1.04 and 0.75 respectively, much higher than the values of 0.15 to 0.27, respectively, for IPOs without lockup. Overall, the results suggest that underpricing explains a significant proportion of the trading volume difference between IPOs with and without lockup.
Conclusion
In our analysis of IPOs, we have taken the stance that pre-IPO owners' prime objective is to establish a liquid market for their shares, as a means of maximizing the market value of their wealth. The owners attempt to accomplish this objective by optimally manipulating critical variables including and especially share retention, underpricing, and a lockup restriction. We develop a theory regarding the effects of, and interactions among, these variables. We also document evidence consistent with these effects and interactions.
It should be noted that our theory does not exclude other hypotheses about IPO underpricing.
IPO is a complicated process that involves many different entities. Pre-IPO owners' motive to improve liquidity is just one aspect of that process. Other aspects of the process, such as the interactions between the entities, may also contribute to the underpricing decision. However, our results do indicate that the magnitude of underpricing is almost negligible for IPOs with very little retention. So share retention seems to be the most important factor here and should play a major role in theories explaining IPO underpricing. This paper reflects our attempts in that direction. Table 1 .
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